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When we intend to hire a professional expert, which type of expert
should we hire? Although it is sometimes claimed that decisions of
experts tend to be conservative, is it optimal to choose a conservative
expert? This paper attempts to answer these questions. It will show
that a principal should hire a conservative expert, i.e., an expert who
has biased preference for maintaining the status quo. The crucial
aspect is that there is a possibility that the expert may not transmit
truthful information. A neutral expert or an expert who has biased
preference for implementing the project has a very strong incentive to
recommend the project. Even when he/she cannot recognize whether
the project is su¢ ciently productive, he may recommend the project.
Hence, a conservative expert is considered to be bene￿cial for the
principal.
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11 Introduction
￿ If you wish to obtain good advice, consult an old man￿ -old proverb.
When a decision maker has to evaluate a new risky investment, he/she
may not have su¢ cient information about the evaluation. To obtain appro-
priate information, a decision maker often hires experts who have superior
information and knowledge regarding the issue on which a decision is to be
made. Doctors, lawyers, and consultants are examples of such experts. A
doctor has superior information than a client, who has to make a decision.
M&A advisors or consultants usually have special information, and they sell
the information to their clients. Hence, information transmission from such
experts is an important factor for decision making. Even within an organi-
zation, some types of experts prove to be useful. Managers lack su¢ cient
information or knowledge to evaluate all potential projects, and they usually
obtain information from experts within or outside the organization.
One big problem in hiring experts is that they may have private bene￿ts
or incentives in in￿ uencing the decision making process, and they may not
transmit truthful information. In some cases, professional experts recom-
mend highly conservative decisions. Li (2001) has pointed out, for example,
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the United States has been
criticized for its overcautiousness in approving new drugs. However, despite
this criticism, the decisions of the FDA have not changed drastically. Can we
justify the usage of recommendations from these conservative experts ? In
general, if we recognize the possibility that experts have incentives for pro-
viding biased opinions, what type of experts should a decision maker hire?
What is the optimal type of contract in such cases? This paper examines
these problems, and we will show that a decision maker should hire an ex-
pert whose preference is biased toward maintaining the status quo, i.e., a
"conservative" expert should be hired.
Biased incentives or motivations of experts have recently been pointed
out by several papers. For example, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a) have
shown that there are many situations in which professional experts tend to
care about their future reputations. Other papers such as Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2006b,2006c), Enrbeck and Waldmann(1996), Graham(1999) also
examined about professional experts. They have shown that the preferences
of professional advisors do not coincide with that of the decision makers. If
experts care about their future reputations, the direct pecuniary payments
2from the principal are not the only incentives that a⁄ect the behaviors of
experts. Prendergast (2007) focused on bureaucrats with a biased motivation.
Although his main focus was on the biased preferences of bureaucrats, he has
shown that biased motivations are quite popular.
To examine this problem more clearly, we consider the following example.
A CEO has a potential project. An advisor is required to be hired to sup-
port the decision making process. Suppose there are two candidates ￿ one
young consultant and one senior consultant. Both of them have su¢ cient
potential to evaluate the project, although both of them have to devote ad-
ditional e⁄orts to obtain su¢ cient information about the project. However,
they have biased preferences. The young consultant has an opportunity to
become the main advisor for the project, and thus, he has a private bene￿t
in implementing the project. On the other hand, the senior consultant might
loose his position if the project is implemented. This implies that the senior
consultant has a private bene￿t in maintaining the status quo, since he al-
ready enjoy a good relationship with the CEO. In such a situation, should
the CEO obtain advice from the young or the senior consultant?
One natural answer to this question would be as follows. When the
e⁄ort level of an expert is unobservable to the decision maker, an incentive
payment to the expert should be necessary. If the preference of the expert is
biased toward implementing the project, the expert will devote his e⁄ort to
realize the private bene￿t, and the decision maker can reduce the incentive
payment. If this intuition is correct, a decision maker should hire an expert
whose private bene￿t is biased toward implementing the project (we refer
to this expert as an "aggressive" expert). In the above example, the CEO
should hire the young consultant. We will show, however, that this intuition
is incorrect. The decision maker should hire a "conservative" expert. The
crucial aspect is that there is a possibility that the expert may not transmit
true information. An aggressive expert has an incentive to recommend the
project, even when he is unable to recognize whether the project is su¢ ciently
productive. If an expert is conservative, however, he/she does not have such
an incentive and recommends the project only when he/she got good signals
actually. This is an intuitive reason as to why decision makers should hire
conservative experts.
There are many papers that examine the problems in hiring experts.
Most of the papers, however, have examined the situation in which there are
no contractual arrangements. Krishna and Mogan (2001) have constructed,
for example, a framework for the transmission of information from experts
3to a decision maker. They have employed the structure of Crawford and
Sobel (1982), that is the ￿Strategic Information Transmission￿mechanism.
As Krishna and Mogan have clearly explained, in the setting mentioned by
Crawford and Sobel (1982), a single expert with a biased preference cannot
transmit truthful information. The intuitive reason is simple. If the contract
arrangements do not exist and the preference of the expert is biased, there
is no bene￿t for the expert to transmit truthful information. Hence, most
papers that have employed the Crawford and Sobel model have considered
cases with multiple experts. Li and Suen (2004) have examined the process of
delegating decisions to biased experts. They have shown that the extreme but
opposite biases are acceptable to a wide range of decision makers. Although
these results have important implications for choosing biased experts, they
did not consider the incentives for expert to gather information. Moreover,
they do not consider the situation wherein the decision maker enters into a
contract arrangements with the experts. In the context of political science, a
setting without a contractual arrangement is natural, but professional experts
usually make contract arrangements and receive pecuniary payments. Hence,
it is natural to consider the situation wherein contracts arrangements exist.
In this perspective, this paper is mostly related to Gromb and Martimont
(2007). They have considered contracted arrangements between a principal
and experts and have derived optimal contracts. Their main subject is to
derive the merits and demerits of hiring multiple experts. They have found
that whether a principal should hire multiple experts is crucially dependent
upon the possibility of collusion among experts. Although we will examine
cases with multiple experts in the later section, our argument focuses on the
biased experts. Thus, our results are very di⁄erent from their results.1
In order to examine the "private incentives," it is important to distinguish
the exogenously given incentives and the endogenously generated incentives.
When the agent perceives private bene￿ts that are independent of the pe-
cuniary payment from the principal, the bene￿t may be exogenously given
(intrinsic) or endogenously determined. In recent times, several papers have
focused on the intrinsic biased preferences. For example, Prendergast (2007)
examined the intrinsic biased motivation of bureaucrats. These intrinsic pref-
erences are a typical example of the exogenously given preferences. Another
1Baliga and Sj￿str￿m (2001) examined biased experts with considering contract ar-
rengements, However, they did not consider the incentives for experts to gather informa-
tion. Morover, they mainly focused on the e⁄ects of peer review and it is much di⁄erent
from the main points of this paper.
4example of the exogenously given preferences is reputation. As Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2006a) have emphasized, reputation is one of the major incentive
mechanisms for experts. Many papers have pointed out that ￿nancial ana-
lysts are highly concerned about their reputation. This process of reputation
accumulation is not intrinsic and endogenously determined by the society;
instead, it must be an exogenous variable for each principal. In this paper
we focus on the exogenously given bias. We do not consider whether those
preferences are intrinsically given or determined by the society. We assume
that experts have biased preferences even without contracts.
On the other hand, several papers have examined endogenously generated
biased incentives. For example, Li (2001) has pointed out that the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) of the United States is criticized for its
overcautiousness in approving new drugs. The main argument of Li (2001)
is group conservatism. He pointed out that the commitment to an ex post
conservative decisions rule can encourage more e⁄ort for experimentation.
Hence, a conservative decision is referred to as a generated decision rule in
the paper. In this perspective, the argument of Li (2001) is related to the
endogenously generated conservatism. The famous argument by Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999) is another example of (endogenously) generated bias. They
have shown that hiring "advocates", agents with generated biases, are good
for a decision maker. Hence, our argument is di⁄erent from that in those
papers that have focused on the endogenously generated bias.
In section 2, we will present the basic model. In section 3, we extend
this argument to the general setting, and in section 4, we consider cases with
multiple experts. In section 5, we conclude our argument.
2 Model
In this section, we consider a situation in which a decision maker (principal)
hires an expert (agent) to obtain information on the productivity of an in-
vestment. We assume that both of them are risk neutral. The principal has
a risky investment project. The payo⁄ of the project is B > 0 if it succeeds
and D < 0 if it does not succeed. Without any advice from the expert,
the knowledge of the principal is limited, and this project is too risky for
him/her, i.e.,
5qB + (1 ￿ q)D < 0 (1)
where q is a prior probability of success. Moreover, we assume that the status
quo payo⁄ is 0. Hence, without information from the expert, the principal
would not undertake the project and would choose to maintain the status
quo.
To increase the probability of success, the principal hires an agent. The
agent has to incur a private cost C to obtain appropriate information regard-
ing the project. By incurring cost C, the agent obtains an appropriate signal
with probability P, and he/she obtains nothing with probability (1 ￿ P).
Here, we assume that the signal improves the knowledge about the project
and increases the probability of success from q to q￿. With regard to the
signal, we can imagine another setting, for example, the signal would only
provide more accurate information on the productivity of the project. If the
project is actually productive, the agent tends to obtain a good signal, and
he/she tends to obtain a bad signal if the project is not productive. Even if
we assume such a situation, the argument of our paper is not a⁄ected, as will
be proved in the appendix. Hence, we simply assume that the probability of
success changes to q￿ > q on the basis of the appropriate signal:
We assume that this information gathering by the agent is e¢ cient, i.e.,
Pfq
￿B + (1 ￿ q
￿)Dg ￿ C ￿ 0: (2)
As long as the agent cannot obtain the appropriate signal, the project is
not undertaken since the expected payo⁄ of the project is negative. With
probability (1 ￿ P), the expected payo⁄ becomes zero.
On the other hand, we assume that the agent has a biased preference for
the project. If the project is not undertaken and the status quo is selected,
the agent obtains a private bene￿t a. Hence, if we consider this private
bene￿t for the judgment of social optimality, condition (2) becomes
Pfq
￿B + (1 ￿ q
￿)Dg ￿ C ￿ a: (3)
However, we should note that this private bene￿t can be negative, which
implies that there is a possibility that the agent is more biased toward un-
dertaking the project. In the later section, we will explain in further detail
about the signi￿cance of negative a.
62.1 Incentive of an expert
The expert provides an advice to the principal on whether the project should
be undertaken (￿go￿ ) or not (￿stop￿ ). A potential problem in this principal-
agent relationship is that the principal has insu¢ cient ability to judge the
quality of information obtained from the agent. Hence, there are two types of
incentive problems for the principal. First the agent may not pay the private
cost C to obtain appropriate information, and second, the agent may not
transfer authentic information. The principal o⁄ers a contract to the agent
in order to solve these incentive problems and obtain appropriate informa-
tion. The contract depends upon the following three possible outcomes: The
contract indicates that the principal pays (1)W H, if the project is undertaken
and successful; (2) W L, if the project is undertaken and it fails; and (3)W 0;
if the project is not undertaken and the status quo is maintained. The prin-
cipal chooses these variables to control the incentive problem of the agent.
Since the principal obtains information only from the expert, the project is
undertaken only when the agent says ￿go￿to the principal.
Next, we examine the incentive problem of the agent. First, the agent has




H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
L ￿ W
0 + a; (4)
W
0 + a ￿ qW
H + (1 ￿ q)W
L: (5)
The ￿rst condition (4) implies that when the agent has appropriate infor-
mation, it is better for the agent to say ￿go.￿Since the agent has appropriate
information, he/she can expect that the probability of success is q￿. On the
other hand, the second condition (5) implies that if the agent does not have
appropriate information, he/she says ￿stop.￿Since the agent does not have
information, the agent￿ s expected probability of success is q.




H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
Lg + (1 ￿ P)(W
0 + a) ￿ C ￿ W
0 + a; (6)
7Pfq
￿W
H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
Lg + (1 ￿ P)(W
0 + a) ￿ C ￿ qW
H
+ (1 ￿ q)W
L: (7)
The left-hand sides of inequalities (6) and (7) represent the net expected
payo⁄ for the agent when he/she decides to pay the information gather-
ing cost C. Without gathering information, the agent has two alternatives:
he/she merely says ￿stop￿ honestly (inequality (6)) or proposes ￿go￿ (in-
equality (7)). The information gathering condition should be satis￿ed under
both these situations, but (7) is redundant as long as (5) is satis￿ed. Hence,
we omit inequality (7).
Moreover, inequality (6) can be rewritten as
q
￿W
H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
L ￿ C=P ￿ W
0 + a; (8)
This implies that inequality (4) is always satis￿ed as long as inequality (8)
is satis￿ed. Hence, only (5) and (8) are the necessary incentive conditions.
Furthermore, we assume that the agent faces liquidity constraints, i.e., the




H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
Lg + (1 ￿ P)W
0
s:t W 0 + a ￿ qW H + (1 ￿ q)W L
q￿W H + (1 ￿ q￿)W L ￿ C=P ￿ W 0 + a
Pfq￿W H + (1 ￿ q￿)W Lg + (1 ￿ P)(W 0 + a) ￿ C ￿ 0
W H ￿ 0;W L ￿ 0;W 0 ￿ 0:
The third constraint is the individual rationality condition. Here we as-
sume that the outside opportunity of the agent is 0. This condition is always
satis￿ed as long as other conditions are satis￿ed, even if a is negative. Hence,
we omit the individual rationality condition hereafter. Moreover, we can eas-
ily prove that it is optimal for the principal to set W L = 0.
Lemma 1 It is optimal for the principal to set W L￿ = 0.
Proof. Suppose W H￿;W L￿;W 0￿ are the optimal and W L￿ > 0. By changing
to W L = 0 and W H = W H￿ +
1￿q￿
q￿ W L￿;the left-hand side of the constraints
8are una⁄ected, but the right hand side of the ￿rst constraint should be de-
creased since
qW H + (1 ￿ q)W L= qW H￿ +
q(1￿q￿)
q￿ W L￿ < qW H￿ + (1 ￿ q)W L￿:
This implies that W 0 can be smaller than W 0￿. Hence, it is optimal to
set W L￿ = 0.
Hence, the above problem can be rewritten as
Min Pq
￿W
H + (1 ￿ P)W
0
s:t: W




H ￿ C=P ￿ W
0 + a (10)
W
H ￿ 0; W
0 ￿ 0:
First, we con￿rm the signi￿cance of negative a.
Lemma 2 Negative a implies that the agent obtains a private bene￿t when
the project is undertaken.
Proof. If the agent receives a private bene￿t, b, when the project is under-
taken, the incentive conditions become, W 0 ￿ qW H+b and q￿W H+b￿C=P ￿
W 0. These are just same as (9) and (10) with negative a.
By solving the above problem, we obtain the following optimal contract.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract for the principal is
W H￿ = C
P(q￿￿q); W L￿ = 0; W 0￿ = ￿a +
qC
P(q￿￿q); if a ￿
qC
P(q￿￿q):
W H￿ = a
q￿ + C




Proof. From (9) and (10), we obtain q￿W H￿ C
P ￿ qW H, and this implies
that W H ￿ C
P(q￿￿q): Moreover, from (9), we obtain W 0 ￿ ￿a+
qC
P(q￿￿q): Hence
as long as a ￿
qC
P(q￿￿q);W H￿ = C





P(q￿￿q), the condition W 0 ￿ 0 is binding. Hence W 0￿ = 0 and
W H￿ = a
q￿ + C
Pq￿ from (10).
9This proposition implies that as long as a is not very high, W 0, the wage
for choosing the status quo should be positive. In other words, although the
project is not undertaken, the expert should obtain some positive gains. An
intuitive reason for this fact is obtained from the truth-telling condition (9).
In order to derive an incentive to say ￿stop￿when the agent is unable to
obtain appropriate information, the principal must pay su¢ cient wages even
if the project is not undertaken.
Another important point of this proposition is that W 0￿ is a decreasing
function of a. Since W H￿ is independent from a, it is better for the princi-
pal to choose an expert who has a larger a. In other words, the principal
should choose an expert whose preference is biased toward not undertaking
the project. This may be a counter-intuitive result. For the incentive of
information gathering, a pro-project expert is naturally better since his pri-
vate bene￿t enhances the information gathering incentive. The above result
shows, however, that another incentive constraint is more important for an
optimal contract. If the incentive for the expert is biased toward undertaking
the project, he/she has an incentive to say ￿go￿even without the appropri-
ate information. In order to avoid this possibility, the principal should pay
W 0￿ even if the project is not undertaken. If the expert is more pro-project
(negative a), this payment W 0￿ becomes higher. Thus, a high value of a can
decrease the total payment of the principal.






q￿￿q(q￿ + q 1￿P
P ) ￿ (1 ￿ P)a if a ￿
qC
P(q￿￿q)




Proof. From the de￿nition of T ￿, T ￿ = Pq￿W H￿ + (1 ￿ P)W 0￿: Hence, by
inserting W H￿ and W 0￿to T ￿, we obtain the result.
From proposition 2, we can understand that T ￿ is a decreasing function of
a, as long as a ￿
qC
P(q￿￿q). An intuitive reason is similar to that of Proposition
1. A higher a can realize lower W 0￿ and decreases T ￿. From this result, we
obtain the following result.




10Proof. We can directly derive this from Proposition 2.
Since a￿ > 0, this proposition implies that the principal should choose
an expert whose preference is biased for not undertaking the project, i.e.,
a "conservative" expert. Moreover, from proposition 2, T ￿ is monotone de-
creasing in the range a ￿ 0. Hence, when the potential set of experts that
the principal can choose is only a ￿ 0, i.e., if all experts are biased toward
undertaking the project, the principal should choose a = 0, i.e., the most
neutral experts.
From proposition 3, we can derive the following comparative statistics.
Proposition 4 @a￿=@C > 0;@a￿=@P < 0;@a￿=@q￿ < 0:
Proof. We can directly derive this from a￿ =
qC
P(q￿￿q)
These comparative statistics show that the optimal a￿ is decreased if an
agent acquires a higher level of technology. This implies that it becomes
better for the principal to hire a more neutral expert, if the information
gathering technology of the experts is improved. We should note however,
that the optimal a￿ is always positive. Hence even if parameters C, P or q￿
have changed drastically, the principal should choose an expert whose private
bene￿t is biased toward not undertaking the project.
2.2 Generalization of the principal￿ s decision
In the above examination, we have assumed that the principal always un-
dertakes the project if the expert advises "go." In this subsection, we will
show that this decision is optimal for the principal even if we consider more
general decision rules. In order to examine the optimal strategy, we assume
that the principal implements the project with probability f(￿ 1) and with
probability (1 ￿ f) if the project is not undertaken even when the expert
recommends to undertake the project. The incentive condition (9) is repre-
sented as follows.
W
0 + a ￿ fqW
H + (1 ￿ f)(W
M + a); (13)
where W M denotes the wage rate when the expert says "go" but the principal




H + (1 ￿ f)(W




0 + a: (14)












Hence, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 5 Let us assume the principal implements the project with prob-
ability f when the expert submits "go." It is optimal for the principal to choose
f￿ = 1 and a￿ =
qC
P(q￿￿q). Moreover, it is optimal for the principal to choose
f￿ = 1 even if a is exogenously given.
Proof. As in the previous section, the optimal minimum payment T ￿ can




H￿ + (1 ￿ f)W
M￿g + (1 ￿ P)W
0￿:






















C ￿ f(1 ￿ P)a:


















+ fa) = C + fPa:
12These results show that T ￿ is a decreasing function of a when a ￿
qC
P(q￿￿q)f,
and an increasing function of a when a >
qC
P(q￿￿q)f. It follows that for any
f, T ￿ is minimized when a =
qC
P(q￿￿q)f and T ￿ becomes
q￿
q￿￿qC: On the other
hand, the principal maximizes
PfV ￿ T
￿;












Next, consider the case in which a is exogenously given. As long as
a ￿ a￿, T ￿ is a decreasing function of f. Hence, PfV ￿ T ￿ is maximized at
f = 1. On the other hand, T ￿becomes an increasing function of f if a > a￿.
Even in this case, however,
PfV ￿ T
￿ = Pf(V ￿ a) ￿ C;
and from (3), V > a. Thus, PfV ￿ T ￿ is maximized at f = 1 even in this
case.
3 Private bene￿t from the success
In the previous section, we have assumed that an expert obtains his/her
private bene￿t when the status quo is chosen (conservative expert) or the
project is undertaken (aggressive expert). In this section, we will examine
the case in which the expert obtains his/her private bene￿t, b, only when the
project has succeeded. In this case, an expert obtains bene￿t W H + b when
the project is implemented and successful, and obtains W 0 when the project



















By solving this problem, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When an expert obtains his/her private bene￿t, b, for the










P C ￿ Pq￿b if b ￿ C
P(q￿￿q)
(1 ￿ P)qb if b > C
P(q￿￿q):
Proof. From the ￿rst and second constraints, we obtain q￿(W H +b)￿ C
P ￿
q(W H + b). This can be rewritten as W H + b ￿ C
P(q￿￿q). Therefore, if
b ￿ C
P(q￿￿q), W H￿ = C
P(q￿￿q) ￿ b and W 0￿ =
qC
P(q￿￿q). This implies that






P C￿Pq￿b. On the other hand,
if b > C
P(q￿￿q);W H￿ = 0 and W 0￿ = qb. Thus, T ￿ = Pq￿W H￿+(1￿P)W 0￿ =
(1 ￿ P)qb:
In this situation, the private bene￿t, b, is a perfect substitute to W H, and
only b + W H is important for the incentive problem of the agent. Thus, the
total payment for the principal, T ￿, is a decreasing function of b unless b is
su¢ ciently high to generate an incentive for the agent. If the private bene￿t
b increases, the wage rate W H can be decreased to equal b. This is the reason
why T ￿ is a decreasing function of b.
Another important implication of this result is that the minimum pay-
ment T ￿ is not always a decreasing function of b, that is, a su¢ ciently high b
is unbene￿cial for the decision maker. Since b is a perfect substitute for W H,
one natural intuition is that if the private bene￿t b is very high, the decision
maker does not have to pay the incentive payments. The above result shows,
however, that this intuition is not true. If the private bene￿t b becomes very
14high, the expert has an incentive to say ￿go￿even without obtaining appro-
priate information. In order to reduce the incentive, the decision maker has
to increase W 0 when the private bene￿t b increases. Hence, choosing a very
high b is not a good strategy for the decision maker.
The next question is whether the decision maker should hire a conserva-
tive expert or a success-oriented expert? We get the following result.
Proposition 7 If a decision maker can choose any type of expert, he should




Proof. When a decision maker hires a success-oriented expert, T ￿ is mini-
mized at b = C
P(q￿￿q) and it becomes 1￿P
P
q
q￿￿qC. On the other hand, if he/she
hires a conservative expert, T ￿ is minimized at a =
qC
P(q￿￿q)f, and it becomes
q￿
q:￿￿qC. Hence, the decision maker should hire a conservative expert (whose







In this section, we consider the situation in which a decision maker hires
multiple experts. It may be natural to ask a multiple number of experts to
obtain more precise information or more appropriate judgments. Even in
the literature, many papers2 have studied cases with multiple experts. Thus,
examination about general properties of multiple experts is beyond the scope
of this paper. In this section, instead, we only consider a simple case which
is a natural extension of the single expert case. Intuitively, if a decision
maker hires two experts, it may be natural to hire the two with contrasting
preferences, i.e., one conservative expert and one aggressive expert. By hiring
these experts, it seems that the decision maker can obtain more appropriate
information. We will show, however, that there is a case wherein the decision
maker should hire two conservative experts.
In order to examine this problem, we consider the following situation.
Two experts attempt to obtain appropriate information for the project. They
gather di⁄erent types of essential information, and the probability of success
2For example, Gromb and Martimont (2007), Li (2000), Li and Suen (2001), Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1999), and Krishna and Morgan (2001)(2004).
15depends on how many experts gathered the essential information. The prob-
ability of success becomes qH if both of them obtain the information, and it
becomes qL if only one expert obtains the information. Here we assume that
q
HB + (1 ￿ q
H)D > 0; (15)
q
LB + (1 ￿ q
L)D < 0; (16)
that is, only when both of them obtain the appropriate information, the
project becomes pro￿table. The private bene￿t of each expert is common
knowledge, and the decision maker (principal) can hire any types of experts.
Experts observe the essential information required for considering the project
with probability Pi as long as he/she devotes su¢ cient e⁄orts. We assume
that P = P1 = P2, i.e., we focus on "symmetric" cases. There is a possibility
that the two information gathering activities are correlated. With probability
P H(￿ P), the expert j can obtain appropriate information if expert i obtains
appropriate information. On the other hand, expert j obtains information
with probability P L(￿ P) if expert i fails to obtain information. Obviously,
PP H + (1 ￿ P)P L = P .
The timing of this game is as follows. First, the decision maker (principal)
chooses two experts (i.e., a1 and a2) and o⁄ers wage contracts W1 and W2
to them,respectively. Second, each agent chooses their e⁄ort level and (if
possible) observes the essential information. Third, both the experts submit
their recommendations to the principal, and the principal determines the
￿nal decision according to the information submitted by the experts. In
this setting, the veri￿able information is the ￿nal outcome of the project.
Although the experts may provide details about the project, the submitted
recommendation ￿go￿or ￿stop￿is not veri￿able. Thus, the wage contract
is only contingent on the outcome of the project. In other words, here, we
assume the "outcome-based contracts."3
The wage function can be written as follows. (1)W H
i , if the project is
undertaken and succeeds; (2) W L
i , if the project is undertaken and fails; and
(3)W 0
i , if the project is not undertaken and the status quo is maintained.
The principal determines the ￿nal decision contingent upon the decisions
submitted by the experts. The best strategy for the principal is to choose
3Gromb and Martimont (2007) has shown that outcome-based contracts are collusion-
proof and report-based contracts are not. This is one justi￿cation for using the ontcome-
based contracts.
16￿go￿only if both the experts say ￿go.￿Since qLB + (1 ￿ qL)D < 0; the
principal chooses ￿stop￿even though one of the experts says ￿go.￿
First, we examine the truth-telling condition of the experts. Suppose an
expert obtains appropriate information. He expects that expert j also ob-
serves the good signal with probability P H. Because of the strategy of the
principal, only when both the experts submits "go" the project should be
undertaken. Thus, if expert i submits "stop," the project is always not un-
dertaken, and he/she obtains W 0
i +ai with probability 1. On the other hand,
if he/she submits "go," the project is undertaken when expert j submits "go"





i + (1 ￿ P
H)(W
0
i + ai) ￿ W
0
i + ai (17)
On the other hand, if expert i is unable to obtain a good signal, he
expects that expert j observes a good signal with probability P L. If he
submits "stop," the project is not undertaken with probability 1, but it will
be undertaken with probability P L if he submits "go." The probability of
success is qL; however, since expert i was unable to obtain a good signal and
submit an advice "go" is ine⁄ective for increasing the actual probability of
success. Thus, the truth-telling condition becomes as follows.
W
0




i + (1 ￿ P
L)(W
0
i + ai) (18)
Next, we examine the incentive condition for devoting su¢ cient e⁄ort.
Without devoting his/her e⁄ort, an expert has two options, say "go" or say
"stop." Even if he/she submits such false information, the other agent may
obtain appropriate information, and the project may be implemented. Thus,


























i +ai)￿C ￿ W
0
i +ai; (20)
17The ￿rst condition (19) is the case in which the expert always says "go"
although he/she does not devote any e⁄ort at all. Since with probability
P, the other expert obtains appropriate information and says "go," he/she
has a chance to obtain W H
i with probability PqL. With probability (1￿P),
however, the other expert does not obtain information, and the project is
not undertaken. The second condition (20) is the case in which the expert
always says "stop" when he/she does not devote any e⁄ort. Since the project
is undertaken only when two experts say "go," the project does not realized
with probability 1.
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i + (1 ￿ P
H)(W
0
i + ai) ￿ C=P ￿ W
0
i + ai;
From these conditions, we can easily show that when (18) and (20) are









and it follows that (17) is redundant. In summary, (18) and (20) represent
the constraints for the principal. Thus, the maximization problem of the
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LW
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18These constraints are quite similar to those in the one expert case. In











as long as the ￿rst and second constraints are binding. Hence, we obtain













P HP(qH ￿ qL)
￿ ai: i = 1;2:
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Even in the case of two experts, the principal should hire two





Proof. Since the principal minimizes PfP HqH(W H
1 +W H





2), he/she should hire experts who can minimize W 0￿
i
and W H￿
i . As long as the constraint W 0
i ￿ 0 is not binding, the principal
should set qHW H
i = C
PHP + qLW H
i from the incentive constraints, and the





PHP(qH￿qL) ￿ ai. Hence if
ai ￿
qLC




1 = 0, and W 0￿
i =
qLC
PHP(qH￿qL) ￿ ai for i = 1;2. On the other hand,
if ai ￿
qLC
PHP(qH￿qL), the constraint W 0






i = 0, and W 0￿
i = 0: These results show that the payments





This result shows that the basic structure is una⁄ected although the prin-
cipal must hire two experts. The principal should hire two conservative
agents. Even if there are multiple agents, it is necessary to provide su¢ cient
incentive to each one of them. In order to derive the truth-telling incentive
even when an agent obtains no information, the principal should pay the
19positive wage for not implementing the project. If each agent has a biased
preference toward maintaining the status quo, the principal can decrease the
incentive payment even if there are multiple agents.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the principal should hire a conservative expert, i.e., an
expert who has a biased preference for maintaining the status quo, if the prin-
cipal can o⁄er contract arrangements. By hiring the conservative expert, the
principal can minimize the expected payment to the agent and can derive
truthful information. This result is very di⁄erent from the previous argu-
ments that have assumed that there are no contract arrangements between
the principal and an agent. An intuitive reason of our argument is simple.
If an agent has a private motivation for implementing the project, he has an
incentive to recommend the project even if he cannot obtain su¢ cient infor-
mation about the project. In order to control such incentive, the principal
has to pay a high amount even when the project is not implemented. On
the other hand, if the agent is conservative (biased toward maintaining the
status quo), the principal is not required to pay so much when the project
is not implemented. Even without such pecuniary incentive, the agent has
an incentive to stop the project. Hence, it is better for the principal to hire
a conservative expert. We have shown a case in which this property is not
a⁄ected even if the principal hires multiple experts.
Lastly, we should argue the possibility that the preference of an agent is
not perfectly observable to the principal. In the previous sections, we have
assumed that the preference of the agent is common knowledge, and the prin-
cipal can observe the biased preference of each agent. In some cases, however,
the principal cannot observe the preference precisely. Even if the principal
cannot observe the preference of an agent precisely, the main results of this
paper are not a⁄ected. Suppose there two groups of experts. One group is
aggressive, and the other group is conservative. The principal cannot observe
the exact preference of each expert. Even in such a situation, the principal
should choose an expert from the group of conservative experts since, from
Proposition 2, we can easily see that the expected total payment is minimized
by employing the group of conservative experts. Hence our argument can be
applied to more general environments in which the preference of an agent is
not perfectly observable.
20A Appendix
In this appendix, we will show that the results obtained in section 2 are
una⁄ected even if an expert is a passive receiver of an e⁄ective signal. As
mentioned in section 2, we assume that an expert has to devote his/her
e⁄ort with private cost C to obtain a signal. Even while devoting the e⁄ort,
however, the agent obtains the signal with probability p and obtains nothing
with probability 1￿p. This signal provides more accurate information on the
productivity of the project. If the project is actually productive, the agent
tends to obtain a good signal, g, i.e., Prfg j Gg = ￿ > 1=2 and Prfg j Bg =
(1 ￿ ￿): On the other hand, if the project is not productive, the agent tends
to obtain a bad signal, b, i.e., Prfb j Bg = ￿ > 1=2 and Prfb j Gg = (1 ￿ ￿).
Hence, the conditional probability of success after observing the good signal
g is
￿q
￿q+(1￿￿)(1￿q) = qH > q and that after observing the bad signal b is
(1￿￿)q
(1￿￿)q+￿(1￿q) = qL < q. Of course, mqH + (1 ￿ m)qL = q, where m denotes
the probability that the received signal is good, i.e., m = ￿q+(1￿￿)(1￿q).
In this situation, the following truth-telling conditions should be satis￿ed.
qHW H + (1 ￿ qH)W L ￿ W 0 + a;
q
HW





0 + a ￿ qW
H + (1 ￿ q)W
L:
W
0 + a ￿ q
LW
H + (1 ￿ q
L)W
L:
The ￿rst condition requires that the agent should say "go" when he/she
observes the good signal. The second (third) condition requires that the agent
should say "stop" when he/she observes nothing (bad signal). Of course, the
third condition is always satis￿ed as long as the second condition is satis￿ed.
Hence, we omit the third condition.
Next, the agent should satisfy the following information gathering condi-
tions.
pfmqHW H + m(1 ￿ qH)W L + (1 ￿ m)(W 0 + a)g
+(1 ￿ p)(W 0 + a) ￿ C ￿ W 0 + a;
pfmqHW H + m(1 ￿ qH)W L + (1 ￿ m)(W 0 + a)g
+(1 ￿ p)(W 0 + a) ￿ C ￿ qW
H + (1 ￿ q)W L:
By rede￿ning pm = P and qH = q￿, these conditions can be rewritten as
21q
￿W





0 + a ￿ qW




H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
Lg + (1 ￿ P)(W




H + (1 ￿ q
￿)W
Lg + (1 ￿ P)(W
0 + a) ￿ C ￿ qW
H
+ (1 ￿ q)W
L:
and these conditions are just same as those in section 2. Hence, we can
conclude that the results in section 2 can be satis￿ed even in this case.
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